

The Role of Intervention in Multi-Actor International Crises

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Abstract

This study examines the effects of international intervention on the resolution of crises in a multi-actor international arena. While there is evidence of a sharp decline in 'pure' interstate crises in the post-Cold War era, there are also indications of transformation in the nature of such disputes from predominantly interstate to compound struggles, involving states and nonstate actors (NSAs). Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, the analysis explores the most effective forms of major power (MP) and international organization (IO) intervention resulting in accommodative outcomes, in different crisis types.

The findings point to the effectiveness of non-coercive diplomatic means and indicate a greater international organization role than is generally described in the literature on international conflict. The findings also highlight the role of nonstate players in shaping crisis dynamics and outcomes and show that while beneficial strategies of interventions are traced in interstate disputes, it is difficult to determine what forms of international behavior are most useful to resolve multi-actor crises. These results shed light on the differing European-American policy perspectives and the measures that should be taken to cope with different crisis types and the threats they pose to global security.

Introduction

The changing world order, starting with the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the close of the twentieth century, embodies changes in the challenges to global peace and security. While there is evidence of a sharp decline in interstate armed conflicts by nearly half in the post-Cold War era, there are also indications of transformation in the nature of international crises, from predominantly interstate to compound struggles which often involve extensive participation of nonstate actors (NSAs).¹

Studies of international intervention in crises and resolution of international disputes vary on the question of whether such intervention should be employed by coalitions of states led by major powers (MPs) or by international organizations (IOs). Proponents of the latter also differ in their view as to whether the UN or regional organizations (ROs) are best suited to such operations. The debate on international intervention further includes concerns about the strategies that should be employed to successfully resolve conflict and establish a stable peace. However, the growing role of NSAs in international disputes produces a multi-actor arena which necessitates a more nuanced outlook on international involvement. While many scholars are aware of the increasing part played by NSAs in world politics, their role in international disputes is

underestimated. Research on international conflict tends to make a sharp distinction between interstate and intrastate strife, and the two conflict types are generally treated as mutually exclusive phenomena, studied in very different ways. Accordingly, studies on interstate crises focus on state actors, even though many such disputes often originate in interactions between states and NSAs. Likewise, when it comes to the study of international intervention into conflict, the literature is generally divided between those works that concern interstate crises and those that investigate intervention in intrastate disputes.²

This study broadens our view by addressing the changing settings of international conflict and bringing the low-intensity nature of ethnically-based conflict into the study of international crisis. Specifically, it differentiates between *Interstate* and *Ethnic-Interstate* crises: in the former all crisis actors are sovereign states who contend over traditional state-centric issues like power, territory, and influence; in the latter type state adversaries (at least two) are involved along with ethnic-NSA(s), and the main contention is over ethnopolitical issues like separatism and power share, as will be detailed in the research design below. Often, such ethnic disputes remain within the boundaries of a single state, igniting civil strife. But when ethnopolitical actors and issues transcend the borders of sovereign states, an international (ethnic-interstate) crisis might erupt.

The study addresses the topic of international intervention and focuses on different interveners and their effects on crisis outcomes, in crises with and without the participation of ethnic-NSAs. The theoretical question posed here is whether and to what extent international intervention affects crisis outcome, in interstate and in ethnic-interstate disputes. More specifically, the study examines high and low levels of involvement employed by MPs and IOs over time, and argues that ethnic-NSAs make a substantial difference in their effects on the way crises end. It is posited that in order to improve our understanding of international conflict, greater attention should be given to ethnic-NSAs, not only in the realms of civil war and international terror, but also in the broader domain of interstate conflict.

This theme falls within the arena of international crises as defined in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project. The ICB dataset, from 1945 to 2005, is useful for examining differences in the behavior of MPs and IOs in different crisis situations, and their efficiency in resolving conflict. This is executed in two sub-periods: the Cold War era (1945-1989), and the post-Cold War period (1990-2005). Understanding trends in MPs' and IOs' role in crises can promote efforts to elaborate means for crisis management and resolution.

I turn first to a brief review of previous studies that examined the role of international intervention into international conflicts. This is followed by a theoretical framework and hypotheses for the relationship between international intervention and crisis resolution. These hypotheses are then put to test by exploring worldwide international crises.

International Intervention in Crises

From a theoretical point of view, the study is motivated by the incomplete picture of international intervention in crises and its influence on crisis resolution. The essay extends the scope of examination by introducing a distinction between interstate and ethnic-interstate crises, aiming to find out what role, if any, do ethnic-NSAs have in shaping crisis outcomes. The examination includes three main aspects: intervener type, level of intervention, and crisis type. Empirically, the study aims to trace patterns of involvement and test its impact over time. Accordingly, it examines high and low levels of involvement, compares between the intervention of MPs and that of IOs, and differentiates between interstate and ethnic-interstate crises. In doing so, it follows those studies that have focused on intervention into international crises, using the ICB dataset (e.g. Beardsley, 2012; Beardsley et al., 2006; Butler, 2003; Meernik, 2000; Wilkenfeld et al., 2003). Yet, unlike previous studies, this article does not focus on decision making processes to choose strategies of involvement, or on internal conditions for international intervention. Rather, it examines the impact of various strategies and challenges the common perception that high-level, mostly military intervention, is prominent among the useful strategies used for resolving international disputes.

In its broadest definition, intervention refers to any action taken by external actors that affects the domestic affairs of another sovereign state. In the case of a crisis, this action is designed to reduce or do away with problems in the bargaining relationship and facilitates the termination of the crisis itself. Theoretically, such intervention that seeks the cessation of on-going violence can be seen as part of conflict management, which is distinct from conflict resolution. The latter has deeper and wider prospects, aiming to remove the roots of the conflict and achieve long-lasting peace. Thus, the cessation of violence and the termination of crises can be viewed as necessary steps toward conflict resolution. If successful, management processes may produce new relational configurations and possibilities for resolving the conflict (see: Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1982; Butler, 2003; Bures, 2007; Dixon, 1996; Werner, 2000; Young, 1967).

The existing literature on international intervention in conflict can generally be divided into the research of intervention in civil war and intervention in international crisis. Few studies have already examined the interrelated dynamics of internal and international conflict. Gleditsch et al. (2008), for example, argue that international disputes that coincide with civil wars are more often directly connected to the issues at stake within the internal war. Other scholars have demonstrated the relationship between ethnic conflict at the state level and its spillover to international conflict, pointing to the growing role of ethnic strife in challenging international security (see for example Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2006b; Carment and James, 1996; Mishali-Ram, 2006). This relationship has become even more prominent in post-Cold War conflicts, both in theory and in practice. Thus, it is argued that to understand international intervention in crises in a multi-actor arena we need to distinguish between interstate and compound ethnic-

interstate crises. To be sure, compound international crises are by definition interstate in scope, always involving at least two nations as adversaries, yet they also include ethnic-NSAs as important participants. These NSAs do not follow the rules of the game as states play them, and thereby may create different threats to international security and influence crisis dynamics and outcomes. It is in this multi-actor context that the current study examines the intervention of MPs and IOs in crises.

Another large body of research examines various strategies to deal with international conflict, focusing on the criteria for successful intervention.³ Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) for example, hypothesized that as the level of MP activity in crisis increases, so does its effectiveness. This hypothesis was supported by findings in the bipolar system, yet in the polycentrism system the proportion of cases in which high level activity was effective dropped considerably. Regan (2002), on the hand, suggests that successful intervention is related to the mutual consent of the parties involved, and the existence of a coherent intervention strategy. Similarly, studies on mediation indicate that consent among the rivaling parties, regarding the process of crisis management, is necessary for crisis termination with agreement, which in turn is likely to bring about long-term tension reduction.⁴

However, consent-based strategies of intervention, like mediation and negotiation, may not always be appropriate in the post-Cold War world, when many disputes relate to ethnic strife. Shearer (1997) observed that in the majority of civil wars most resolutions follow a military victory rather than political negotiations. He suggests that the parties in such disputes are more prone to resist resolution by political negotiation. Such conflicts, which he typifies as "warlord insurgencies", are now embodied in both the state and the international levels, like in Sudan and Afghanistan, and international strategies should quickly adapt to these changes. In other words, the theory of international intervention should take into account the characteristics of post-Cold War crises that combine state and nonstate elements. Although works on intervention provide insights on the effectiveness of different strategies, they undervalue the growing role of NSAs in a changing world conflict.

While national interests such as security, economy or ideology guide a state's intervention in international conflict, common interests, often including the provision of humanitarian assistance in deadly conflicts, frequently direct the involvement of international organizations (Miller, 2004; Yoon, 1997). While IOs are by definition third parties in crises, the ICB project differentiates between those crises in which the MPs themselves are crisis actors, from those in which they play intermediary roles. In the former case, MPs are among the states whose foreign policy decision makers perceive three necessary and sufficient conditions of crisis.⁵ In the latter, they intervene as third parties, in various ways. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) note that there is a thin line between MPs functioning as crisis actors, and MPs in third party roles. The analysis presented here, although aware of this distinction, includes all the crises in which the major powers are involved, without disaggregating the data in terms of their roles as either crisis actors or third parties. That is to say, the analysis includes both cases. The multiplicity of MPs' interests lead them to perceive utility even in other states' conflict

and makes them more likely to intervene in international disputes in order to solve these matters “to suit their own preferences” (Corbetta and Dixon, 2004; Patrick 2002).

The role of IOs in crises is the theme of an ongoing debate. While most studies agree that the UN has had limited short-term success in intervening in international disputes, their conclusions are not entirely consistent (Beardsley, 2012; Diehl et al., 1996; Haas, 1986; Semb, 2000; Shirkey, 2012). According to Haas (1986), for example, the UN is effective in relatively minor disputes. In contrast, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) found that the more serious crises, defined by such measures as violence in trigger and crisis management, high threat levels and large number of actors, produced higher levels of UN involvement. And while Diehl et al., (1996) found that UN intervention was ineffective in inhibiting, delaying, or lessening the severity of future conflicts, Beardsley (2012) found that UN military intervention does well to decrease the risk of one side achieving victory, and diplomatic engagement increases the likelihood of compromise in the long run.

Another question concerning the role of IOs is whether peacekeeping operations should be carried out by the UN or by regional organizations. Heldt and Wallenstein (2005) examined global patterns of peacekeeping in different organizational frameworks and found greater involvement on the part of the UN in interstate conflicts, as compared to non-UN actors. Yet they found that intervention by ROs is often more successful due to more culturally homogeneous forces, as well as to local knowledge and possible affinity with the warring parties. In a more recent examination however, they found that the UN tends to be assigned to the more serious cases, but not less successful (Wallenstein and Heldt, 2007). The present study addresses this question within the multi-actor international system, testing the success of intervention in terms of crisis resolution.

Theoretical Framework

Within the large domain of international crisis, the study focuses on *outcome* – a core crisis attribute that has imperative implications for our understanding of international conflict. Specifically, outcome is examined in terms of crisis termination with agreement. The starting point of the essay is that crisis termination, conflict management and conflict resolution comprise a consecutive process, within a broader framework of conflict study. Crisis outcome is a vital factor in this progression because crises ending in agreement are expected to show a tendency to long-term tension reduction (Beardsley et al., 2006). Diehl et al. (1996) found that crises culminating in compromise are associated with less future conflict. Likewise, Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram (2006a) have used international crisis as a tool to analyze protracted conflicts and regarded outcome as an attribute that establishes the link between one crisis and the next, because the mode in which a crisis ends sets forth the agenda for future interactions and confrontations. This logic expresses the substance of this study and its implications: it is assumed that effective intervention in the short run would positively influence long-term conflict resolution and thereby contribute to international peace and stability.

The Interveners and the Contending Parties in Crisis

Central to the analysis of crisis termination and conflict resolution is the type of interveners in a dispute, their motivations and the modes of action they take. International intervention relates here to the level of involvement by the major powers (MPs – i.e. the U.S. and the USSR/Russia), and international organizations (IOs – i.e. the UN and regional organizations, ROs) during a crisis.⁶

According to Carment and Rowlands (1998), the principal objective of intervention is to reduce and eliminate armed violence. An alternative view however, can see MP intervention as part of foreign policy means that aims to promote the intervener's national security interests, sometimes even at the cost of escalating the crisis rather than abating it (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; Regan, 2002). Because MPs have broader strategic interests and a greater capacity to project power beyond their own borders, they tend to become more involved in international crises than less powerful states. Their dominant status and influence enable them to employ high-level involvement in many occasions (i.e. military and semi-military actions), which have a detrimental effect on the behavior of all the participating actors in the crisis. Based on the combination of their undisputed power and essential interests, it is expected that the involvement of MPs in a crisis, including their implementation of a variety of persuasive and coercive means, would enforce crisis termination. Moreover, when MPs intervene in international crises in order to pursue their own national interests they are likely to support one side in the crisis or another. In so doing, their involvement frequently serves to widen and increase the conflict, rather than promote compromise and agreement.

Thus, MPs involvement in crises has a price. Their intervention is often regarded as coercive and brutal, thereby reducing consent among the parties involved and breeding resentment against the external actor, as evident in the manner in which the Iraqi, the Afghan and the Pakistani peoples currently perceive foreign involvement in their countries, led by the USA. So while MPs intervention may be necessary in order to suppress threats to international security, their motives are constantly suspected, mainly by weaker actors that do not always favor their interference.

As pointed out in the works by Regan (2002), Wilkenfeld et al. (2003), and Beardsley et al. (2006), consent among the involved parties regarding the interveners' identity and strategy would be required to terminate the crisis with an accommodative outcome. Such consent is expected mainly when non-forcible intervention, regarded here as low-level involvement, is employed. Thus, the hypothesis about MP involvement in crises is as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Crises with high-level MP involvement are less likely to end in accommodative outcomes than crises with low-level involvement.

But not all interveners in crises are sovereign states. IO involvement in international disputes is shaped by the nature of these actors, be they global or regional, widely or

limitedly recognized in the international system. IOs are less powerful than MPs and their involvement in crises is dictated by common interests, not by specific national goals. As such, they are more likely to bring about consent among the parties to the dispute. And while MPs are likely to support one side in the crisis and have a negative effect on crisis abatement, IOs usually employ a more balanced intervention that decreases the likelihood of victory by either contender. Such balanced situations are expected to increase the willingness of the rivaling actors to pursue a negotiated conclusion to a crisis.

To be effective, however, interveners should have the capacity to project power and influence. IOs obtain their power and authority from the joint action of multiple sovereign states and depend on their willingness to intervene in conflict situations. Often, diverse views and differing interests of an IO's members restrain its conducts and its ability to affect crisis process and resolution. When, on the other hand, shared interests stand behind an IO involvement, intense intervention is employed, which is necessary in order to affect crisis process and termination. Thus, the hypothesis about IO involvement in crises is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Crises with high-level IO involvement are more likely to end in accommodative outcomes than crises with low-level involvement.

The prospects of accommodative crisis outcomes are of course also linked to the contending parties themselves – their power and interests, and the context within which they operate. Since most of the post-Cold War disputes involve not only states but also nonstate players, the incorporation of these actors into the analysis of international crises is necessary for a comprehensive approach to such disputes. The following two hypotheses relate to international intervention in crises while taking into account crisis type, namely, crises with and without the participation of ethnic-NSAs.

In all kinds of crisis it is reasonable to expect non-accommodative conclusions because international confrontations are, by their very nature, unlikely to result in compromise. However, it is reasonable to expect that different strategies of intervention would have diverse effects when employed in different crisis types. In interstate crises rules of conduct and procedures of international law have evolved to assist in the reconciliation process among states. By contrast, when NSAs are involved, the rules of the game and the core issues in crisis change, so less accommodative outcomes are expected. In these cases the lack of international law and rules of conduct turn even the rare cases of ethnic-interstate reconciliation into fragile exceptions. They must withstand pressures of extreme factions on the NSAs' side, as well as the likelihood that states will push for imposed solutions. In such unbalanced situations, intensive MP intervention is required to enforce non-coercive processes. High-level MP intervention in ethnic-interstate crises may bridge conceptual and tangible gaps among the contending actors, and provide new relational configurations that would enable them to negotiate agreed-upon solutions. Thus, the hypothesis about MP intervention in interstate and in ethnic-interstate crises is as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Low-level MP involvement is more likely to contribute to accommodative outcomes in interstate crises, while high-level intervention is more likely to contribute to accommodation in ethnic-interstate crises.

When it comes to IO intervention, the distinction between interstate and ethnic-interstate crises necessitates the consideration of IO competence and character. Such organizations possess limited power resources, the implementation of which depends on the relations among leading members of the organization. More specifically, their interventions are legally and practically a function of influential states' agreement and endorsement. Accordingly, IOs utilize certain modes of intervention in crises, which compared to those employed by MPs are less intensive and decisive. Thus, high-level IO involvement in crises may be effective in interstate crises, where the main contenders are sovereign states who share international norms, often favoring compliance with the broader international community. When NSAs are involved, it is more difficult to formulate agreed-upon processes of crisis management. In such crises, high-level means employed by IOs may not be rigorous enough to enforce negotiated solutions, and are therefore expected to be ineffective in crisis abatement. Thus, the hypothesis about IO intervention in interstate and in ethnic-interstate crises is as follows:

Hypothesis 4: High-level IO intervention is more likely to contribute to accommodative outcomes in interstate crises, while low-level involvement is more likely to contribute to accommodation in ethnic-interstate crises.

Research Design and Data

The study uses the ICB dataset to examine the way international intervention affects crisis outcomes. The unit of analysis is an international crisis. The analysis includes 349 crises occurring between 1945 and 2005, observed in two sub-periods: the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period, aiming to detect changes over time. In order to examine the effects of MP and IO intervention in crises, cross-tabulation and logistic regression analyses are employed, controlling for the context of the confrontation and for specific crisis attributes, expressed in four control variables that are standards within contemporary research designs.

Crisis outcome, the dependent variable, relates to the way crises end. Specifically, it refers to the form of the outcome of an international crisis at its termination point. The form of outcome is determined by the configuration of forces operative during a crisis and has an important bearing on the subsequent relation among the parties to a crisis. Based on ICB variable and values (FOROUT) a distinction is made here between cases that were concluded by compromise and those that ended with non-conciliatory outcomes, and its two values are coded as follows: 0. *Accommodative* outcomes: all conciliated outcomes between the rivaling parties including formal, semi-formal, or tacit

agreements; 1. *Non-accommodative* outcomes: all non-conciliated outcomes between the rivaling parties including imposed agreements, unilateral acts and faded crises.⁷

International intervention, the independent variable of the study, regards the involvement of two actor types: major powers (MPs) and international organizations (IOs).

Major Powers Involvement assesses the nature of U.S. and USSR activity (or Russian activity after 1991) during the crisis. Activity is defined as any substantive verbal or physical act, regardless of whether the MP was itself a crisis actor. If more than one form of activity occurred, the most intense was identified. The variable is tested twice, once for each MP, and its values are assigned in four categories as follows: 1. *No involvement*; 2. *Political/economic*; 3. *Semi-military*; 4. *Direct military*. The first two are considered low-level (coded as 0) and the last two are high-level involvement (coded as 1).⁸

International Organizations Involvement describes the nature of the activity employed by the UN and ROs in the crisis. ICB variables are used and their values recoded into four categories as follows: 1. *No involvement/discussion without resolution*; 2. *Moderate diplomatic*; 3. *Severe diplomatic/economic*; 4. *Emergency military force*. The first two are considered low-level (coded as 0) and the last two are high-level involvement (coded as 1).⁹

However, MP and IO interventions are not implemented independently. They are in fact literally and causally entwined, and their interactions may affect crisis dynamics and outcomes. UN involvement in crises, for example, depends legally and practically on MP concurrence, which is in turn a function of the ability of MPs to achieve their goals. Thus, aiming to detect possible mutual effects between interveners, various combinations of their involvement are coded and added to the model. These combinations relate to most evident connections, manifested in activities of MPs and the UN.¹⁰

Interveners' Mutual Effects refer to combinations of MPs and the UN involvement in crises. It includes eight situations: 1. No involvement; 2. U.S. only; 3. USSR/Russia only; 4. UN only; 5. Two MPs – U.S. & USSR; 6. U.S. & UN; 7. USSR/Russia & UN; 8. Other (various combinations including ROs).

The four control variables tested in the model include context and specific crisis attributes. The context variable relates to the period within which the crisis takes place, and crisis attributes refer to crisis type, power gap, and crisis magnitude.

Period divides the years under study into two phases, according to the polarity structure of the global system and its interaction patterns at the time of the crisis, which are coded as follows: 1. *The Cold War period* (1945-1989); 2. *The post-Cold War period* (1990-2005).¹¹

Crisis Type differentiates between international crises by the actors and issues involved, assigned in two values: 1. *Interstate Crisis* - an international confrontation where all actors are sovereign states, contending over traditional state-centric issues of existence, power, territory, and influence. The Cuban missiles crisis (1962) and the Falkland War (1982) are examples of interstate crises; 2. *Ethnic-Interstate crisis* - an international confrontation that involves state adversaries along with ethnic-NSA(s).

These cases evolve over ethnopolitical issues as the most salient concern in the confrontation. Ethnopolitical issues refer to various goals and stakes of ethnic (and religious) groups, including the pursuit of separation/autonomy from the states that rule them, or the quest for greater participation/power share within existing states. The Kashmir crisis (1947-49) illustrates the former kind of ethnopolitical issues in crisis, and the Afghanistan War (2001) exemplifies the latter. When ethnic disputes remain within the boundaries of a single state, civil strife is likely to break out. But when ethnopolitical actors and issues transcend the borders of sovereign states, an international crisis might erupt.

Power Gap measures the discrepancy between the power statuses of the leading dyad in a crisis. First, the two main adversaries are identified in each crisis, and their power statuses are coded based on the four level scale in ICB dataset.¹² Accordingly, the values of the dyadic power gap are coded here as follows: 1. *Power parity*, 2. *One level gap*, 3. *Two level gap*, 4. *Three level gap*.

Finally, in order to contend with a potential problem of endogeneity of intervention, the nature of the crises and the circumstances of intervention are taken into account. To this end, crisis magnitude, encompassing three core crisis attributes, is coded. This enables us to examine what, if any, are the characteristics of crises in which MPs and ROs are prone to intervene, and whether these characteristics inevitably affect crisis outcomes.

Based on studies that introduced indexes to classify crisis severity (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2006a; Ben-Yehuda and Sandler, 2003; Brecher and James, 1986), **Crisis Magnitude** is measured according to three indicators: level of violence, gravity of threat, and number of crisis actors. The values of each attribute are coded as low (0) or high (1).¹³ Accordingly, the overall magnitude score of a crisis, combining the coding of these three indicators, ranges between 0 and 3 (0 when coded 0/low on all three indicators, and 3 when coded 1/high on all three). The four values of crisis magnitude are therefore coded as follows: 0. Minimal magnitude, 1. Low magnitude, 2. Medium magnitude, 3. High magnitude.

Findings

A brief review of the 349 crises under study shows that the growing part of ethnic conflict is visible not only in terrorism and internal wars but also in international crises: while 227 cases (65%) were 'pure' interstate, 122 crises (35%) were compound ethnic-interstate. A comparative review between the two periods shows that the rate of ethnic-interstate crises has significantly increased from 32% in the Cold War period to 48% in the post-Cold War years, indicating the growing role played by ethnic-NSAs in international disputes and emphasizing the importance of exploring these events in order to develop improved strategies of crisis management. But does crisis type make a difference when international intervention and crisis outcome are concerned? The role of

intervention is first examined in crises all together, then separately in interstate and ethnic-interstate cases.

The effects of international intervention on crisis outcome

Starting with the role of MPs in crises, H1 anticipates that high-level MP involvement would be less likely to contribute to accommodative outcomes than lower level strategies. By and large, the results of the cross-tabulation analysis, shown in the whole period column (1945-2005) in Table 1a, seem to support H1. However, the involvement of the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have some different effects on the way crises end. The most common form of American intervention is low-diplomatic activity, as illustrated in the North Korea Nuclear crisis (1993)¹⁴, yet such involvement is associated with accommodative outcomes as much as non-intervention (46%). American semi-military and direct military interventions are least likely to bring about agreement in outcomes (34% and 37%, respectively). USSR/Russian's highest level of intervention, i.e. direct-military participation, although infrequent, is most likely to result in accommodative terminations (47%), as exemplified in the Azerbaijan crisis (1945).¹⁵ Here again, no and low-level involvement are equally associated with accommodation (44%) and semi-military intervention appears to be the least useful behavior on the part of the USSR/Russia (33%).

When looked at over time we realize that as we move forward into the post-Cold War years, not only does the U.S. continue to employ diplomatic intervention as a major mode of behavior in crises, but also that such low-level involvement most often results in agreed upon outcomes (63%, compared to a rate of 41% in the first period). Russia still prefers non-intervention, yet the data do not reveal a significant relationship between its level of activity and crisis outcome in the post-Cold War years. Diplomatic involvement, then, is the most useful form of MP involvement in both periods, but much more effective in the second. Semi-military activity is the least effective mode of intervention. Interestingly, unlike the first period, direct military intervention by the U.S. in post-Cold War crises is also likely to result in accommodative outcomes, though less than diplomatic means.

Turning to IO involvement, the cross-tabulation results presented in the whole period column in Table 1b, show that UN severe diplomatic/economic measures are most associated with accommodative outcomes (55%), much more than emergency military actions (37%) or moderate diplomatic involvement (36%). Agreement in crisis termination was achieved in 45% of the crises with no UN involvement (or discussion without resolution). These results partly support H2, which anticipates that crises with high-level IO involvement would be more likely to end in accommodative outcomes. In other words, it is high-level UN diplomatic involvement, but not military intervention, that is positively related to crisis abatement, as illustrated in the first Yugoslavia crisis (Croatia-Slovenia, 1991).¹⁶

Table 1a. Major Power Involvement, Period and Crisis Outcome, 1945-2005

Major Power Involvement	The Whole Period* 1945-2005			Cold War Period** 1945-1989			Post-Cold War Period*** 1990-2005		
	Accommod. Outcome	Non- Accomm. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non- Accomm. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non- Accomm. Outcome	Total
U.S.									
No involvement	47 (46%)	56 (54%)	103 (29%)	41 (44%)	53 (56%)	94 (32%)	6 (67%)	3 (33%)	9 (16%)
Political/Econom.	64 (46%)	76 (54%)	140 (40%)	45 (41%)	65 (59%)	110 (38%)	19 (63%)	11 (37%)	30 (54%)
Semi-military.	22 (34%)	43 (66%)	65 (19%)	20 (34%)	38 (65%)	58 (20%)	2 (29%)	5 (71%)	7 (12%)
Direct military	15 (37%)	26 (63%)	41 (12%)	10 (32%)	21 (68%)	31 (10%)	5 (50%)	5 (50%)	10 (18%)
Total	148 (42%)	201 (58%)	349 (100%)	116 (40%)	177 (60%)	293 (100%)	32 (56%)	24 (44%)	56 (100%)
USSR/Russia									
No involvement	73 (44%)	93 (56%)	166 (48%)	54 (40%)	81 (60%)	135 (46%)	18 (60%)	12 (40%)	30 (53%)
Political/Econom.	48 (44%)	61 (56%)	109 (31%)	37 (41%)	53 (59%)	90 (31%)	12 (59%)	8 (41%)	20 (36%)
Semi-military.	19 (33%)	38 (67%)	57 (16%)	18 (34%)	35 (66%)	53 (18%)	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	4 (07%)
Direct military	8 (47%)	9 (53%)	17 (05%)	7 (47%)	8 (53%)	15 (05%)	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	2 (04%)
Total	148 (42%)	201 (58%)	349 (100%)	116 (40%)	177 (60%)	293 (100%)	32 (56%)	24 (39%)	56 (100%)

The percentages are accounted by the content of involvement.

* U.S. involvement: $X^2=4.442$, $p<0.05$; USSR/Russia involvement: $X^2=3.358$, $p<0.05$

** U.S. involvement: $X^2=6.247$, $p<0.05$; USSR/Russia involvement: $X^2=6.168$, $p<0.05$

*** U.S. involvement: $X^2=5.135$, $p<0.05$; USSR/Russia involvement: $X^2=1.812$, $p<0.1$

The increase in global organizational involvement over time is accompanied by a change in the effectiveness of its various levels of activity. While diplomatic involvement remains much more effective than military intervention, the largest portion of accommodative outcomes is found in crises with no UN involvement (72%). Moreover, while severe diplomatic/economic measures were more effective than moderate ones in the first period (63% vs. 33%), in the subsequent years the ratio is significantly transformed (42% vs. 50%, respectively). These findings appear to disprove H2, indicating a major change in the UN role in crises over time. In fact, a contradictory pattern is found in the latter period: the lower the level of UN involvement, the more likely an accommodative outcome. It seems that this kind of intervention by the global organization best suits the multi-actor international arena, corresponding with findings on the role of MPs' diplomatic involvement in crises over time.

The findings on ROs involvement in crises show that their role is quite similar to that of the UN, although the results are statistically significant only for the first period. Its most effective intervention is diplomatic (RO moderate diplomatic involvement is associated with accommodation in 48% of the cases, and severe diplomatic intercession in 50% of the crises). Preliminary indications from the latter period imply that RO moderate diplomatic activity, like that of the UN, is more likely to contribute to agreed outcomes. Concerning the ongoing debate on which of the two types of organization is more effective in coping with international disputes, the results do not indicate that one is significantly more effective than the other, but may imply that operations by the UN and by ROs are complementary rather than contradictory, and thus should continue to coexist. Further research is needed to guide us as to how the function should be divided between them in various conflict situations.

When introducing crisis type into the analysis, relating to participation of ethnopolitical NSAs, it is found that on the whole, ethnic-interstate crises are less likely to end with agreement than are interstate cases (38% vs. 44%, respectively). But how does international intervention affect the different crisis types? H3 anticipates that while low-level MP involvement would contribute to accommodation in interstate crises, high-level MP intervention would contribute to accommodation in ethnic-interstate crises. The findings show that indeed MP intervention has diverse effects on crisis outcomes in different types of dispute. In interstate crises, lower-level MP intervention is more effective in promoting agreed upon outcomes, as shown in Table 2a. In fact, there is a negative relationship between the level of U.S. involvement and the likelihood of crisis accommodation – the higher its involvement the lower the rates of accommodation (54% in cases with no involvement, 49% in low diplomatic involvement, 34% in semi-military, and 32% in direct military intervention). The effectiveness of the USSR/Russia involvement is at the extremes of the scale: its direct military intervention is the most effective mode of behavior (54%), followed by non-involvement (50%).

Table 1b. International Organization Involvement, Period and Crisis Outcome, 1945-2005

International Organization Involvement	The Whole Period 1945-2005*			Cold War Period 1945-1989**			Post-Cold War Period 1990-2005***		
	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accommod. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accommod. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accommod. Outcome	Total
UN	89 (45%)	109 (55%)	198 (57%)	72 (41%)	102 (59%)	174 (59%)	18 (72%)	7 (28%)	25 (45%)
No involvement	33 (36%)	58 (64%)	91 (26%)	25 (33%)	50 (67%)	75 (26%)	8 (50%)	8 (50%)	16 (29%)
Moderate dipl.	18 (55%)	14 (45%)	32 (09%)	12 (63%)	7 (37%)	19 (06%)	5 (42%)	7 (58%)	12 (21%)
Severe dipl/Econ	3 (37%)	5 (63%)	8 (02%)	2 (40%)	3 (60%)	5 (02%)	1 (33%)	2 (67%)	3 (05%)
Emergency milit.	5 (25%)	15 (75%)	20 (06%)	5 (25%)	15 (75%)	20 (07%)	—	—	—
Multiple/other	148 (42%)	201 (58%)	349 (100%)	116 (40%)	177 (60%)	293 (100%)	32 (56%)	24 (44%)	56 (100%)
RO	82 (40%)	123 (60%)	205 (59%)	63 (36%)	112 (64%)	175 (60%)	20 (65%)	11 (35%)	31 (55%)
No involvement	30 (48%)	32 (52%)	62 (18%)	23 (47%)	26 (53%)	49 (17%)	6 (50%)	6 (50%)	12 (22%)
Moderate dipl.	17 (50%)	17 (50%)	34 (10%)	14 (54%)	12 (46%)	26 (09%)	3 (37%)	5 (63%)	8 (14%)
Severe dipl/Econ	2 (25%)	6 (75%)	8 (02%)	1 (14%)	6 (86%)	7 (02%)	1 (100%)	—	1 (02%)
Emergency milit.	17 (42%)	23 (58%)	40 (11%)	15 (42%)	21 (58%)	36 (12%)	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	4 (07%)
Multiple/other	148 (42%)	201 (58%)	349 (100%)	116 (40%)	177 (60%)	293 (100%)	32 (56%)	24 (44%)	56 (100%)
Total									

The percentages are accounted by the content of involvement.

* UN involvement: $X^2=6.455$, $p<0.05$; RO involvement: $X^2=6.939$, $p<0.05$
 ** UN involvement: $X^2=7.654$, $p<0.05$; RO involvement: $X^2=6.198$, $p<0.05$
 *** UN involvement: $X^2=6.007$, $p<0.05$; RO involvement: $X^2=2.788$, $p<0.1$

Table 2a. Major Power Involvement, Crisis Type and Outcome, 1945-2005

Major Power Involvement	Interstate Crises*			Ethnic-Interstate Crises**			Total		
	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accomm. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accomm. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accomm. Outcome	Total
U.S.									
No involvement	32 (54%)	27 (46%)	59 (26%)	15 (34%)	29 (66%)	44 (36%)	47 (46%)	56 (54%)	103 (30%)
Political/Econom.	41 (49%)	43 (51%)	84 (37%)	23 (41%)	33 (59%)	56 (46%)	64 (46%)	76 (54%)	140 (40%)
Semi-military.	17 (34%)	33 (66%)	50 (22%)	5 (33%)	10 (67%)	15 (12%)	22 (34%)	43 (66%)	65 (19%)
Direct military	11 (32%)	23 (68%)	34 (15%)	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	7 (06%)	15 (37%)	26 (63%)	41 (11%)
Total	101 (44%)	126 (56%)	227 (100%)	47 (38%)	75 (62%)	122 (100%)	148 (42%)	201 (58%)	349 (100%)
USSR/Russia									
No involvement	53 (50%)	53 (50%)	106 (47%)	19 (32%)	40 (68%)	59 (49%)	72 (44%)	93 (56%)	165 (47%)
Political/Econom.	30 (42%)	42 (58%)	72 (32%)	19 (51%)	18 (49%)	37 (30%)	49 (45%)	60 (55%)	109 (31%)
Semi-military.	11 (31%)	25 (69%)	36 (16%)	8 (36%)	14 (64%)	22 (18%)	19 (33%)	39 (67%)	58 (17%)
Direct military	7 (54%)	6 (46%)	13 (05%)	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	4 (03%)	8 (47%)	9 (53%)	17 (05%)
Total	101 (44%)	126 (56%)	227 (100%)	47 (38%)	75 (62%)	122 (100%)	148 (100%)	201 (100%)	349 (100%)

The percentages are accounted by the content of involvement.

* U.S. involvement: $X^2=6.989$, $p<0.05$; USSR/Russia involvement: $X^2=4.564$, $p<0.2$

** U.S. involvement: $X^2=1.714$, $p<0.5$; USSR/Russia involvement: $X^2=3.91$, $p<0.2$

When it comes to ethnic-interstate crises, the picture changes and actually reversed. Here U.S. direct military activity is most likely to result with agreed-upon terminations (57%) followed by low-diplomatic intercession (41%). Russian direct military intervention, on the other hand, is not likely to contribute to agreement (25%), while its low-diplomatic involvement is highly associated with compromised outcomes (51%). These mixed results partly support H3. In effect, they do so specifically in the case of the U.S. but not with respect to the USSR/Russia. However, the results in Table 2a indicate that, as hypothesized, diverse approaches are required when coping with different crisis types. Notably, MP non-intervention is highly associated with agreement in crisis termination in interstate crises but not in compound ethnic-interstate disputes.

Turning to the role of IOs in different crisis types, H4 anticipates that while high-level IO intervention would contribute to accommodative outcomes in interstate crises, low-level involvement would contribute to accommodation in ethnic-interstate crises. The data show that severe diplomatic/economic means on the part of the UN in interstate crises is mostly associated with accommodation (55%), while military intervention is the least likely to produce agreement (25%). In ethnic-interstate crises severe diplomatic activity remains the most effective level of involvement (54%), but this time it is followed by military intervention (50%). In both cases, relatively high rates of accommodation are found in crises with no UN involvement (45% and 44%, respectively), as shown in Table 2b.

The effects of ROs involvement in interstate crises are similar to those of the UN, with severe diplomatic actions as by far the most useful approach to crisis management (60%), and military actions as the least probable to result with accommodation (20%). However, the same cannot be said with regard to compound crises. Here moderate diplomatic means are most likely to bring about concurrence among the rivaling parties (48%). These findings, as shown in Table 2b, do not support H4, except for the results of ROs in ethnic-interstate cases. High-level IO intervention is more likely to contribute to accommodative outcomes in interstate crises but only as long as it is limited to severe diplomatic measures, without resorting to military action. The effects of intervention by the UN and ROs on compound ethnic-interstate crises are different and in fact inverse.

Since 'outcome' is a dichotomous dependent variable, binary logistic regression is an appropriate method for testing the effects of international involvement on the way crises end. The control variables included in this analysis are the period within which the crisis occurs, crisis type, power gap and crisis magnitude.

The empirical results of the logistic regression are consistent with findings reported above, indicating that U.S. intervention matters, significant at the 0.01 level, but USSR/Russian involvement does not. UN and ROs involvement also matter, significant at the 0.05 level, as presented in Table 3(a). It seems that, as hypothesized, there is a negative relationship between the U.S. intervention and the likelihood of accommodative outcome: the higher its level of involvement, the lower the likelihood of an agreed upon solutions. More specifically, the odds of accommodation when the U.S. is not involved in crisis are 1.663 times the odds of accommodation when the U.S. is highly involved. IOs on the other hand, are a positive influencing factor in crisis ending. The likelihoods of

agreement in outcome when the UN and ROs are highly involved are, respectively, 0.994 times and 0.795 times the odds of agreement when they are not involved.

It is also found that period has a strong impact on outcome, significant at the 0.01 level. These results point to the robust influence of system structure, embodied in the periods examined here, on crisis dynamics and endings. It can be inferred that the characteristics of the new international system, where mixed-motive games, multi-actor confrontations and inter-power cooperation replace the deep mistrust of the Cold War years, increase the efficacy of international intervention in crises.

Crisis type also matters at the 0.05 level. As hypothesized, agreement among the rivals is less likely at the end of ethnic-interstate crises than in interstate cases. Ethnic-interstate crisis is a complex game and it can be inferred that rules of the game diverge and patterns of conduct change when both states and ethnic-NSAs are involved. Here the dictates of international law are often contested, and power attributes are based on resources of unique and hard to compare elements.

The findings indicate that power gap between the two leading adversaries also affects crisis outcomes, significant at the 0.05 level. No and small gaps are positively associated with accommodative outcomes, while higher gaps are negatively associated with accommodation. Most notable, the likelihood of agreement in crises with no power gap between the leading adversaries is 1.155 times the odds of agreement in crises with other power relations. It appears that power supremacy enables actors to impose crisis termination without having to compromise with inferior rivals. Power parity and proximity on the other hand, often enforce negotiated solutions, thereby increasing the probability of accommodative outcomes. This factor however, does not contradict the effects of MPs and IOs on the likelihood of such outcomes.

Taking into account a potential problem presented by endogeneity of intervention, I examine if there are particular types of crisis in which MPs and ROs are prone to intervene, and whether the characteristics of these cases affect their outcome. Crisis magnitude is used to characterize crises by three of their core attributes, ranking the severity of each crisis between 0-3 according to the level of violence, the gravity of threat and the number of crisis actors. As could be expected, the data indicate that none of the interveners under study is likely to get highly involved in crises of minimal magnitude (0). All of them focus their high-level foreign policy efforts on crises whose magnitude range between 1 and 3. Interestingly, while MPs are frequently highly involved in crises of magnitude 2 and IOs are often highly involved in crises of magnitude 1, only the circumstances of the U.S. interventions are found to be significant ($X^2=13.16$ $p=.004$). Namely, intervention is distributed quite erratically across different crises, irrespective of their severity. Adding magnitude to the model reveals that the nature of the crisis does not alter the effects of MP and IO involvement on crisis outcome. The effects of the U.S., the UN and ROs remain significant when crisis characteristics are considered.

Table 2b. International Organization Involvement, Crisis Type and Outcome, 1945-2005

International Organization Involvement	Interstate Crises*			Ethnic-Interstate Crises**			Total***		
	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accom. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accom. Outcome	Total	Accommod. Outcome	Non-Accom. Outcome	Total
UN									
No involvement	65 (45%)	78 (55%)	143 (63%)	24 (44%)	31 (56%)	55 (45%)	89 (45%)	109 (55%)	198 (57%)
Moderate dipl.	19 (42%)	26 (57%)	45 (20%)	15 (32%)	32 (68%)	47 (39%)	33 (36%)	58 (64%)	91 (26%)
Severe dipl/Econ	11 (55%)	9 (45%)	20 (09%)	6 (55%)	5 (45%)	11 (09%)	18 (55%)	14 (45%)	32 (09%)
Emergency milit.	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	4 (02%)	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	4 (03%)	3 (37%)	5 (63%)	8 (02%)
Multiple/other	5 (33%)	10 (67%)	15 (06%)	0 (0%)	5 (100%)	5 (04%)	5 (25%)	15 (75%)	20 (06%)
Total	101 (44%)	126 (56%)	227 (100%)	47 (39%)	75 (62%)	122 (100%)	148 (42%)	201 (58%)	349 (100%)
RO									
No involvement	56 (42%)	78 (58%)	134 (59%)	26 (37%)	45 (63%)	71 (58%)	82 (40%)	123 (60%)	205 (59%)
Moderate dipl.	19 (49%)	20 (51%)	39 (17%)	11 (48%)	12 (52%)	23 (19%)	30 (48%)	32 (52%)	62 (18%)
Severe dipl/Econ	12 (60%)	8 (40%)	20 (09%)	5 (36%)	9 (64%)	14 (12%)	17 (50%)	17 (50%)	34 (10%)
Emergency milit.	1 (20%)	4 (80%)	5 (02%)	1 (33%)	2 (67%)	3 (02%)	2 (25%)	6 (75%)	8 (02%)
Multiple/other	13 (45%)	16 (55%)	29 (13%)	4 (36%)	7 (64%)	11 (09%)	17 (42%)	23 (58%)	40 (11%)
Total	101 (44%)	126 (56%)	227 (100%)	47 (39%)	75 (62%)	122 (100%)	148 (42%)	201 (58%)	349 (100%)

The percentages are accounted by the content of involvement.

* UN involvement: $X^2=6.59$, $p<0.05$; RO involvement: $X^2=4.97$, $p<0.05$

** UN involvement: $X^2=7.88$, $p<0.05$; RO involvement: $X^2=6.40$, $p<0.05$

*** UN involvement: $X^2=3.69$, $p<0.05$; RO involvement: $X^2=3.53$, $p<0.05$

Table 3. Binary Logistic Regressions of International Intervention and Crisis Outcome

(a). Intervention examined independently

International intervention	Accommodation in Outcome	
	B	Exp(B)
U.S. Involvement	-1.508**	1.663
USSR/Russia Involvement	.760	1.079
UN Involvement	.182*	.994
RO Involvement	.229*	.795
Period	1.660**	.405
Crisis Type	- 1.425*	1.591
Power Parity (no power gap)	1.595**	.203
One Level Power Gap	1.059*	.347
Two Level Power Gap	-1.236**	.290
Minimal Magnitude (0)	.144	1.155
Low Magnitude (1)	-.291	.748
Medium Magnitude (2)	-.011	.989
Number of cases	335	
Percentage of cases predicted correctly	71.8	
Nagerkerke R Square	.256	

(b). Combined Interventions

Combined Interventions	Accommodation in Outcome	
	B	Exp(B)
No involvement	.018	.982
U.S. alone	-.748*	2.211
USSR/Russia alone	.014	1.014
UN alone	.006*	.673
U.S. & USSR/Russia	.642	1.901
U.S. & UN	.596*	1.815
USSR/Russia & UN	.025	.720
Period	.788**	.455
Crisis Type	-.456*	1.578
Number of cases	335	
Percentage of cases predicted correctly	62.6	
Nagerkerke R Square	.254	

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Finally, since MP and IO interventions in crises are not employed exclusively or independently, various combinations of their involvement were coded and added to the model, in an effort to identify mutual effects between interveners. As the logistic regression analysis shows in Table 3(b), when various combinations are examined, only the U.S. and the UN as single interveners affect crisis outcome. Crisis type and period remain significant, supporting the above conclusions that ethnic-state crises are less likely to end with agreement, and that intervention is generally more effective in the post-Cold war years.

When looking at situations where the U.S. intervenes alone the results show again that it has a negative effect on crisis outcome, so the odds of accommodation in crises with its sole involvement are 2.211 times less than crises without its participation, significant at the 0.05 level. The insertion of combined interventions into the model somewhat reduces the explanatory power of the UN as a single intervener, yet approves the positive influence this organization has, on its own, on crisis abatement. However, in the presence of both the U.S. and the UN, international intervention positively affects crisis outcome, significant at the 0.05 level, implying that joined actions taken by these two interveners can improve the prospects of agreed-upon solutions. The likelihood of accommodation in crises with combined U.S.-UN involvement is 1.815 times the odds of accommodation without their shared intervention. It is reasonable to deduce that while intervention conducted by the U.S. alone is perceived as unilateral and coercive, at least by some of the crisis actors, its intervention combined with UN activity is more coordinated with the rivalling parties, probably also with other third-party countries involved, thus perceived more favourably and has better prospects to promote consent among the rivals at the end of the dispute. While none of the other combinations indicate a significant role in promoting agreement in outcome, the results demonstrate once again the central role played by the U.S. and the UN as interveners in international crises, both independently and jointly.

Conclusions

The changing world politics encompasses opposing trends, involving a decline in interstate warfare on the one hand, and continuing social, ethnic and religious conflicts on the other. On the whole, these tendencies do not yet provide a safer world to live in and necessitate further examination of useful forms of confronting current challenges to international peace and security. The first contribution of this study has been to improve our understanding of the effectiveness of different forms of international intervention, employed by MPs and IOs in crises over time. Its second contribution has been the focus on interventions in a multi-actor arena, emphasizing the role of NSAs, who should attain greater attention in the study of international conflict.

It has been shown that the U.S. and USSR/Russia were both highly involved in crises, yet the U.S. was found to be more globally oriented than the USSR/Russia. Long term examination reveals that the post-Cold War era is characterized by diverse foreign

policies on the part of the MPs. In the initial post-Cold War years, it seemed that Russia's policies were mainly directed at consolidating its influence in the former Soviet regions, in an effort to emerge as the dominant power in this area. Russia's involvement in international disputes is still focused mainly on its economic and political status in its own region rather than in distant areas. However, its activity in recent years, as for example evident in the Iranian nuclear issue, implies that Russia is reviving its earlier attempts to regain the influence exercised by the USSR as a leading power in the broader international arena. U.S. policy, on the other hand, is consistently global and includes intervention in some regional disputes in distant areas in the world.

The findings support the expectation that military and semi-military MP interventions would reduce the likelihood of agreement in crisis outcome. Particularly, the U.S. level of involvement is found as an indicating factor of the way crises end. American diplomacy, not military actions, is the most successful involvement in terms of crisis resolution. These results accord with Huth's (1998) assertion that military intervention by MPs can have a decisive impact on the outcome of international disputes. Such intervention can deter the outbreak of war or lead to military defeat of aggressors when policies of deterrence have failed. At the same time, military intervention can have a negative impact on crisis ending. Apparently, military intervention most often results in imposed crisis termination, wherein neither understanding nor a real reduction of tension is achieved between the belligerents, both of which are essential for long-term peace and stability. Thus, the conclusions of this study support the assertion that consent-based strategies of crisis management are most useful for the termination of international disputes (see also Beardsley et al., 2006; Regan, 2002; Wilkenfeld et al., 2003). This may be even more relevant in the international atmosphere of the last two decades, which is often characterized by growing anti-western sentiments expressed in some parts of the world, and the general challenge to western dominance in world politics.

Observation over time also shows that the removal of superpower enmities allows the UN greater accessibility to conduct international crises. It appears that the new environment is more open to global security enforcement than to regional intervention, indicating a greater capacity of the UN and its access to global resources. To be accurate, high-level IO involvement is the most effective form of behavior in terms of crisis outcomes, but only as far as severe diplomatic and not military means are employed. In fact, the data show a greater IO role than is generally described in the literature on international conflict, indicating that the impact of intervention is more pronounced in severe crises, in which the dispute escalates into a violent confrontation. This is particularly of interest regarding the UN, which a series of studies has found to be likely to intervene as a peacekeeping force only after violence has come to an end or been reduced.

Moreover, the results point to the contribution of combined U.S. and UN involvement to agreed-upon solutions. While crises with U.S. involvement only are prone to non-accommodative outcomes, crises where both the U.S. and the UN are involved are likely to end with consent. The findings then, contradict the conclusions of existing empirical works on the effectiveness of UN intervention in crises, which

generally suggest that the global organization has very limited success when intervening in such disputes (see Butterworth, 1978; Diehl et al., 1996; Haas, 1986; Wallensteen and Heldt, 2007).

It has also been shown that diverse approaches are required when coping with different crisis types. As anticipated, in 'pure' interstate crises low-level MP intervention and high-level IO intervention are more effective in promoting agreed upon outcomes, while mixed results are found in compound ethnic-interstate cases. This is reasonable considering the multifaceted and asymmetric nature of such confrontations, where often there is no mutual recognition in, or basic legitimacy to one another's subsistence and goals. The findings highlight the role of nonstate players in shaping crisis dynamics and outcomes and show that while beneficial strategies of interventions are traced in interstate disputes, in the multi-actor field of ethnic-interstate crises it is difficult to determine what forms of international behavior are most useful. Considering the increase in the occurrence of compound struggles in the latter years, future studies may look into these conflicts, distinguish between various NSA types and issues involved, and try to detect the causal mechanisms of their escalation and resolution processes.

The conclusions of this study shed light on differing European and American policy perspectives in the new world order, and the measures they should take in order to cope with them. The findings appear to support European reliance on multilateral diplomatic efforts to solve international disputes, more than what is viewed as a 'muscular' American approach, which often in the last decade has relied on unilateral military force to confront threats to the global security. Certainly, military intervention may be necessary in order to suppress security threats such as radical Islamism and global terrorism in certain post-Cold War conflicts, but in order to be effective, such military intervention needs to be accompanied by multilateral diplomatic activity. Diplomacy, promoted by the UN and reinforced by the MPs, is perceived as more favorable and legitimate, and therefore appears to be the most effective form of international intervention into conflict. The implications of this essay are notable in terms of achieving long-lasting understanding between rivals and may promote efforts by policy makers to elaborate strategies for crisis management and resolution. Terminating crises with agreement in the short run may reduce the likelihood of recurrent disputes, thereby contributing to long-term conflict resolution and promoting international peace.

NOTES

1. See: Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2006b; Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Hewitt, 2007; Marshall, 2005.
2. On intervention in interstate crises see: Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Corbetta and Dixon, 2004; Patrick, 2002. On intervention in intrastate conflicts see: Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Aydin and Regan, 2006; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; DeRouen and Bercovitch, 2008; Gent, 2008; Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004; Regan, 2002; Regan and Frank, 2009.
3. See: Bapat and Morgan, 2009; Bercovitch and Houston, 2000; Bloomfield and Moulton, 1997; Huth, 1998; Regan, 2002; Shirkey, 2012; Wehr, 1996.
4. See: Beardsley et al., 2006; Bercovitch and Houston, 2000; Conteh-Morgan, 2001; Terris and Maoz, 2005; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003.
5. The three ICB-defined conditions include: a threat to basic values, an awareness of finite time for response and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.
6. The essay follows a macro system-level definition of an international crisis. According to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 4-5) an international crisis occurs when there is a change in type and/or an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities. These changes, in turn, destabilize the relationship between the states and challenge the structure of an international system.
7. This distinction was used by Wilkenfeld et al., 2003, as well as by Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2006; and Mishali-Ram, 2006. According to ICB's system level dataset, within 'accommodative outcomes' *formal agreements* include treaties, armistices and cease-fire agreements; *semi-formal agreements* refer to letters and oral declarations; and *tacit agreements* relate to mutual understandings by adversaries, neither stated nor written. Within 'non-accommodative outcomes' *imposed agreements* include agreements among the adversaries to end hostilities, achieved following pressures by MPs, IOs, coalitions or other powerful actors; *unilateral acts* refer to actions by a crisis actor, without the voluntary agreement of its adversary, like military intrusion and severance of diplomatic relations; *faded crises* relate to cases fade with no known termination date and no known agreements among the adversaries.
8. *Political/economic* activity includes statements of approval or disapproval by authorized government officials; economic involvement, e.g., financial aid or the withholding of aid from an actor; and propaganda involvement; *semi-military* activity includes covert activity, e.g., support for anti-government forces, and military aid or advisors without participation in actual fighting; *direct military* activity involves dispatch of troops, aerial bombing of targets or naval assistance to a party in a war.

9. ICB's GLOBACTM and REGACTMB variables include 13 categories: 0= UN/regional organization not exist; 1= no activity; 2=discussion with no resolution; 3= fact finding, 4= good offices (minimal involvement in both the content and process of resolving a dispute); 5= condemnation (an implied or explicit demand to desist); 6= call for action (call for cease-fire, withdrawal, negotiation or other actions to facilitate termination); 7=mediation (proposing a solution or offering advice and conciliation of differences); 8= arbitration (designing formal binding settlement by arbitral body); 9= sanctions (economic, political-diplomatic, or military); 10= observer group; 11= emergency military force; 12=general other. For the logistic regression analysis these values were recoded into 5 categories: 0-2→1=no involvement; 3-6→2= moderate diplomatic; 7-10→3= severe diplomatic; 11→4= military. ICB's value 12 (general other) is included in the crosstab testes and excluded from the logistic regression.
10. Considering all possible combinations of MPs and IOs would result in small cells and insignificant results. For statistical purposes, combinations relate to the MPs and the UN, and small categories are combined, as detailed below.
11. Since these two periods differ in their time frames, the analysis refers to relative results in each period, in order to detect major trends and changes over time.
12. Each crisis is first located in one of two system levels - the subsystem (or mainly subsystem) or the dominant system. Then the power status of each crisis actor is determined according to its relative status in the system where the crisis takes place. Including measures of GDP, population size, territorial size, military capability and alliance relationships vis-à-vis great powers, the ICB coding of power status is assigned in four levels: 1. small power, 2. middle power, 3. great power, 4. superpower.
13. *Violence* is coded here as low (0) when there are no violence or minor clashes between the rivaling parties, and coded as high (1) when the crisis involves serious clashes or war. *Gravity of threat* is coded as low (0) when the major threat in the crisis is economic, political, influence-related or involves limited military damage. It is coded as high (1) when there are territorial threats, grave damage, or a threat to existence. *Number of crisis actors* is coded as low (0) when there are 1-3 actors, and coded as high (1) when there are more than 3 crisis actors.
14. Intense North Korea-U.S. negotiations over the North Korean nuclear proliferation resulted in an "Agreed Framework", according to which Korea would freeze its nuclear activities and the U.S. would arrange an international consortium to build two replacement reactors that would provide North Korea with ample nuclear energy, with much less risk of extracting plutonium for nuclear weapons.
15. A strong position adopted by the U.S. against the movement of Soviet troops toward Teheran, to support a rebellion for the autonomy of Azerbaijan, combined with the resistance of Iran and Security Council meetings on the Iranian case, led the Soviet Union to reach an agreed-upon crisis resolution. The agreement declared that Iranian territory would be evacuated within six weeks, that a joint Soviet-

Iranian oil company would be established and that Moscow recognized Azerbaijan as an internal Iranian problem.

16. The Security Council adopted Resolution 713, which called for a complete arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The Secretary-General and the UN special envoy were highly involved in diplomatic efforts, including the mediation of several cease-fires during the war, notably the last cease-fire agreement that terminated the crisis.

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